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 The ambiguity of
 accountability
 Relationships of corruption and control
 Mark Findlay
 Introduction
 CORRUPTION is a relationship of power and influence, ex
 isting within, and taking its form from specific environments
 of opportunity. Opportunity is, in turn, designated by the
 aspirations for such a relationship, and structures and proc
 esses at work towards its regulation.
 Both the creation and blocking of corruption opportunities are con
 sequences of corruption control. Corruption regulation does not pro
 gress from prevention ideology to operational strategies in terms of
 total control, and therefore the regulatory space within which corrup
 tion and control interact becomes a construction of dependence.
 In commercial market structures, corruption and control exist in a
 sometimes symbiotic state. For example, the influence of control struc
 tures over market entry and operation can foster monopolistic condi
 tions conducive to particular corrupt enterprise.1 These forms of
 enterprise then complement the initiatives of state-sponsored control
 institutions. Monopoly enterprise in any sector of a market relies on
 regulatory perimeters, and if these arise from the operations of anti
 corruption institutions, and the enterprise is criminal or corrupt, then
 the link between the institution and the enterprise is clear, if unfortu
 nate.
 The corruption/control nexus, at the level of market regulation,
 provides a means of interaction with the market and allows for contact
 between the regulator and market participants in ways which establish
 the regulator's authority.2 In addition
 the presence of the regulator in the
 market is in circumstances which need
 not inevitably lead to confrontation, or
 punitive action. The adverse conse
 quence of requiring accountability is
 often enough to gain compliance or
 to produce a penalty.
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 Accountability is neither a feature of the corruption relationship, nor
 necessarily of control mechanisms. Corruption thrives on anonymity,
 while control agencies regularly rely on powers which grow out of
 autonomous authority. The appreciation of corruption as a social
 threat however, is constructed in a very public/political arena, and the
 expectations for its control have been created as community-centred.
 The genesis of the Independent Commission Against Corruption
 (ICAC) in NSW, as a product of political rhetoric and community un
 ease about corruption, confirms the public dimension of corruption
 discourse, and the community indebtedness of the institutions charged
 with its control (see Bersten & Hogg, 1988). Therefore, while corrup
 tion and control may exist beyond public view, the corruption/control
 nexus relies on accountability in a variety of interesting circumstances.
 These go well beyond the obvious calls for the open and responsible
 exercise of criminal justice.
 This paper examines the ambiguous position of accountability within
 corruption control.3 Accountability is as essential to the language of
 corruption prevention, as it is to the nature of the powers which con
 trol agencies exercise and the sanctions which they impose (see ICAC
 Annual Report, 1990: Chapt. 8; 1991: Chapt 8). Yet, the varied insti
 tutional and procedural requirements for accountability can produce
 contradictory results. For example, where the determination that cer
 tain stages of corruption investigations should be held in public is said
 to guarantee the community interest, the individual rights of persons
 under investigation may be jeopardised through public exposure
 (ICAC Parliamentary Committee, 1990). Also the competing expec
 tations for accountability in situations of corruption control, and the
 manner in which accountability emerges at various stages of the control
 process, highlights particular dilemmas in the corruption/control
 nexus. These will be explored more fully later in the paper.
 Some of the difficulty here lies with confusions concerning what ac
 countability represents or requires. Such confusion is compounded by
 the expectations for accountability as a feature of corruption control,
 and the diverse applications of accountability obligations to dimen
 sions of the corruption/control relationship (see ICAC, 1993).
 The paper explores the significance of accountability for corruption,
 and for control. This dual focus reveals the position of accountability
 within the opportunity structures which promote the corruption/con
 trol nexus. It also provides tentative suggestions that through real civic
 engagement, accountability possesses the potential to energise corrup
 tion control strategies, democratise their operations, and neutralise
 their adverse consequences.
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 Accountability
 In the crime control equation accountability can be viewed as the bal
 ance to discretion. However, there exists considerable uncertainty of
 perception and definition surrounding the understanding and repre
 sentation of accountability. Much of this uncertainty, particularly
 within criminal justice, emanates from the association between ac
 countability and penalty.
 Freckelton and Selby refer to accountability as the 'obligation to an
 swer for a responsibility which has been conferred' (1988:225). In this
 definition they emphasise:
 i) the requirement to explain,
 ii) the stewardship of a duty, and
 iii) the relationship between the duty and its source.
 The utility of accountability is identified by Reiner (1985) when he
 observes that its institutionalised forms will only be truly efficacious
 when they work within and win over the more general mechanisms for
 discipline and control within an organisation.
 Brogden places accountability in a wider political agenda by describ
 ing it as 'institutional arrangements made to ensure that (individuals)
 do the job required of them'. In addition he suggests that account
 ability is 'the degree of control political institutions have over (other
 institutions and operatives)' (1988:151).
 Each of these dimensions on accountability reveal the complexity of
 the process; a complexity which goes well beyond punitive intentions
 and consequences. Accountability involves:
 Identification Of responsibility In this respect accountability is
 an expectation which results from a structure of responsibility. The
 requirement that accountability should be sheeted home to an individ
 ual, and for individualised responsibility, means this process of'naming'
 goes beyond the apportionment of guilt, and more towards the rami
 fications of shared relationships of responsibility.
 Openness Particularly with respect to crime control debates, re
 quirements for openness in the exercise of investigatory and punitive
 powers have featured recently. Community interests are now more vo
 cal in their expectations for liaison and consultation with crime control
 agencies. These institutions for their part are now expecting that com
 munities should be openly implicated in the crime control process.
 Popular participation Not so much as a characteristic of account
 ability, but as a check on its dimensions, participation in criminal justice
 by a wide range of interests is advanced. If such participation is both
 popular and representative, then claims for accountability appear more
 convincing.
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 Audit Accountability relies on identifiable structures of responsibility,
 and codes of conduct against which the behaviour of individuals and
 organisations might be critically reflected. The audit function of proc
 esses of accountability should not only expose individual shortcomings
 through this comparison, but also inadequacies in these responsibility
 structures and conduct expectations.
 Compliance The proactive dimension of accountability arises out of
 the potential to combine responsibility, openness, participation and
 audit into a motivation towards compliance. Effective accountability
 measures and mechanisms gain functional credibility as much from
 their pressure to alter behaviours and relationships as they do from
 simply exposing 'blocks' to good government.
 Complaints and discipline A common, and unduly pejorative
 conceptualisation of accountability is as a euphemism for discipline and
 penalty. The mechanisms for ensuring accountability, as so envisioned
 are usually activated by individual complaints and therefore produce
 adversary consequences. At least some of the participants in such ac
 countability contests will only view accountability as something to be
 avoided.
 The background for Stigmatisation, and re-integration
 Where accountability does retain a co-operative image, it still relies on
 processes of labelling and Stigmatisation for its social impact. Whether
 such labels are eventually reintegrative or exclusionary will depend on
 a variety of environmental determinants which precede the behaviours
 and relationships under review.
 Relationships of accountability
 As is the case with corruption, the significance of accountability rela
 tionships relies on the positions of power and authority retained by the
 participants. All too often the power structures which underlie such
 relationships are not sufficiently appreciated when expectations for ac
 countability are formulated.4
 Accountability as a consequence of power differentials within any
 relationship, will also be profoundly influenced by community percep
 tions. The social situations in which accountability is expected are
 largely reliant on perception. These perceptions extend to the prob
 lematic aspects of the relationship necessary for review, as well as to the
 powers exerted towards requiring accountability. Therefore, in the case
 of the ICAC in NSW, the political portrayal of corruption necessitated
 the investigation of the relationships of public office. However the
 form and process of such investigation were unusual enough to see
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 both political and community interests requiring that these be made
 accountable.
 Accountability as a process incorporated within corruption control
 prevention strategies is both proactive and reactive. The investigation
 of breakdown in structures of responsibility, the criminogenic potential
 of secrecy, partiality in participation, and the corrupt results of audit,
 are primarily reactive. However community awareness campaigns, the
 development of codes of conduct, and the creation of an anti-corrup
 tion consciousness are preventative and therefore proactive in motiva
 tion.
 Finally when considering relationships of accountability it is essential
 to discuss mechanisms as well as product. The interpretations of ac
 countability considered above cover institutional manifestations as well
 as their expected achievements. Accountability therefore arises within
 material structures, institutional relationships, and the processes and
 consequences which they produce.
 Relationships of accountability are usefully applied to relationships
 of corruption, because to some extent they are interdependent with
 situations of opportunity. Whereas corruption as a market choice de
 pends on the necessary conditions of opportunity which favour cor
 ruption, accountability as a mechanism of control depends on similar
 conditions for choice, and opportunities for achievement.
 Conditions of opportunity
 1. For corruption In market terms relationships of corruption are
 fostered through monopolistic (or oligopolistic) regulation (see Ben
 son & Baden, 1985). Corruption/control processes are market regu
 lators and as such may facilitate monopolistic market conditions as they
 inevitably fail to eliminate corrupt relationships entirely from the mar
 ket.
 It should not be forgotten that the decision for at least one party to
 enter into a corrupt relationship makes good commercial sense. The
 corrupt relationship may also generate opportunities for further mar
 ketability which increase the profit incentive. Therefore corruption is
 linked to commercial opportunity-creation in a manner similar to a
 number of other legitimate market conditions.
 Certain market structures, and enterprise incentives are facilitated
 through corrupt relationships. The profitable consequences of such
 facilitation adds stimulus to the maintenance and development of cor
 rupt relationships, as conditions of profitability.
 2. For regulation Control of corruption is one legitimate objective
 of market regulation. It can form a concern for traditional regulatory
 practices through administrative rules and licensing. However, there
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 are also significant 'regulatory' consequences which arise out of the
 incursion of criminal justice into market conditions.
 Selective law enforcement, for example, can isolate and exclude some
 market participants, and neutralise some corrupt relationships, while at
 the same time indirecdy favour and benefit the corrupt relationships
 and participants which remain. In this respect, additional opportunities
 for control and regulation are created.
 For a market analysis of corruption and control, it is perhaps more
 helpful that control and regulation be discussed in terms of their exist
 ence within, and impact on the market, rather than their structural and
 functional intentions.
 3. For corruption/control nexus Opportunities for corruption
 may be fostered where a dislocation exists between control ideology,
 and regulatory practice. For example, if police activity against corrup
 tion is represented as total, where in practice it is selective, policing may
 in fact insulate those corrupt relationships which survive beyond selec
 tive law enforcement. In this way the reality of control becomes linked
 to the dynamics of corruption.
 It would be extreme to argue there is a conscious connection be
 tween control and corruption, although in obvious ways they are mu
 tually dependent. What I am suggesting is that the position of control
 initiatives, and corrupt relationships within market situations generate
 opportunities for this nexus as an unintended consequence of corrup
 tion control. This nexus then tends to alter the conditions under which
 further opportunities for corruption can develop.5
 Control dilemmas and confusion
 When considering the nexus between corruption and control, and the
 impact which accountability might have on this, the dilemmas which
 face corruption control initiatives should not be. overlooked. These
 dilemmas form boundaries around the control as a market condition,
 and therefore fundamentally influence the nexus between corruption
 and control.
 Independence V accountability How far can institutions of cor
 ruption control be required to account for the exercise of their powers,
 without compromising the legitimacy of their claimed independence?
 Responsibility V indemnity How can processes of corruption
 control advance their legitimacy through the responsible exercise of
 accountable power, while advertising individual indemnity as an inves
 tigatory tool?
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 Publicity V secrecy How is the balance to be struck between the
 community interest in seeing corruption controlled, and the need to
 maximise investigative efficiency in secret?
 Anonymity V exposure To what extent should the punitive con
 sequences of corruption control accompany each stage of exposure
 through investigating, and where should the rights of the individual
 gain the protection of anonymity?
 Selectivity v total enforcement If the ideology of corruption
 control is total prohibition, then how can it sit with processes of selec
 tive enforcement?
 Accountability and structures of permission
 So far we have considered relationships of corruption and control, con
 ditions for opportunity, and situations of accountability in a rather
 separate fashion. It is within structures of permission that they merge.
 In market analysis, the market is a general 'structure of permission'.
 What is implied by this concept is some space within which behaviours,
 connections, and consequences are expressly and implicitly allowed. It
 is a dynamic state where any condition might vary within the perime
 ters of tolerance.
 Accountability connects with structures of permission in two princi
 pal ways. First, it forms an important part of the perimeters of toler
 ance. Requirements for accountability limit the nature and progress of
 market relationships, and require the establishment and operation of
 structures of responsibility. Second, accountability can become a posi
 tive link between opportunity, market relationships, and mechanisms
 for their regulation. For instance, where a monopolised market creates
 the opportunity for a particular enterprise, and the enterprise is tradi
 tionally covert, corrupt relationships may arise to service the enterprise.
 If the methods employed to regulate the enterprise rely on stages of
 accountability then these have the potential to alter the conditions of
 the enterprise and its reliance on corruption.6
 By focussing on corruption and control, while ignoring the struc
 tures of permission within which they connect, an accurate apprecia
 tion of their impact on other market relationships becomes difficult.
 Accountability has the potential to expose the reality of corruption and
 control at the same time as it identifies the nexus between them both.
 Accountability as the new sanction
 In many respects the position of accountability within corruption con
 trol in NSW has now developed a new punitive dimension. Public hear
 ings, and findings of corrupt conduct7 are punishment without penalty.
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 As for the accountability of the control institutions, court decisions
 and reports of parliamentary committees9 have constrained its powers.
 These punitive dimensions of accountability sanctions delimit struc
 tures of permission both for corrupt relationships, and control initia
 tives. However such limits do not effectively address the opportunities
 for corruption, and control, which exist within structures of permis
 sion.
 Also by constructing accountability sanctions in punitive terms, the
 impact of corruption control as market regulation may strengthen its
 nexus with the corrupt relationships which remain.
 Position of accountability between
 corruption and control
 Accountability has the potential to limit corrupt relationships, and to
 empower corruption control. This will occur when it influences cor
 ruption and control as they exist within structures of permission.
 Changes in these structures of permission will necessarily bring about
 shifts in opportunity for both corruption and control.
 From the perspective of those institutions and agencies of which ac
 countability is required, rarely will it be considered as enhancing 'op
 portunity'. Rather accountability is internally perceived as curtailing
 the exercise of discretion which is seen as essential to opportunities for
 both the legitimate and illegitimate exercise of power. Mechanisms for
 requiring or ensuring accountability are suspected of punitive motiva
 tions, and not considered as complementing the exercise of'real' insti
 tutional functions.
 The ambiguity of individual and institutional attitudes to account
 ability, and its position within law enforcement culture in particular,
 becomes apparent when the authority of enforcement or control agen
 cies is claimed through their connection with the community. As with
 the ideology of community policing, accountable police practice is said
 to confirm the responsible exercise of police power. Abuses of power,
 and malpractice, once identified at the community level will stand op
 posed to police authority, and be rejected by it. The contradiction
 grows when this vision for police power is placed against the police view
 of their power and its appropriate exercise. Police occupational culture
 tolerates the abuse of power, or occasions of malpractice, so long as
 they conform with the precepts of that culture.
 Where accountability takes institutional or individual power outside
 the occupational framework to expose control strategies to 'commu
 nity' ideology, this may remove the mechanisms of accountability over
 the 'boundaries of permission' which prevail in law enforcement cul
 ture. Resistance to these mechanisms of accountability from within the
 culture is a consequence of any such process of exposure.
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 But what this simple oppositional view of control and accountability
 ignores is the dynamics of the accountability process. Accountability is
 as much concerned with the confirmation of appropriate practice as it
 is designed to reveal malpractice or the abuse of power. In addition
 accountability mechanisms may operate in ways which are supportive
 of both good and bad enforcement or control practice. The difficulty
 lies not so much with features and consequences of accountability, but
 how it is perceived. For example, a control agency may see it as appro
 priate to use accountability to expose corruption, and even punish its
 perpetrators, but react in a hostile fashion to attempts at making the
 control process itself accountable.
 Accountability mechanisms may also adopt or employ practices simi
 lar to those which they would otherwise expose to criticisms. Investi
 gations may be clandestine, coercive and unresponsive to independent
 enquiry. And the consequences of such practices may prove to be as
 unjust or abusive as those of the powers under review.
 When control strategies attempt to operate beyond the realm of ac
 countability they tend to generate opportunities for behaviour, and
 relationships which themselves stray over the edge of legitimacy.10 In
 addition, discretion to control when exercised selectively, has the po
 tential to open up opportunities for corrupt relationships while closing
 down others.
 Accountability provides a window on both corruption and control.
 Through the participatory dimension of most accountability mecha
 nisms the community may do more than simply observe any unwanted
 cohesion between corruption and control. For citizens to enjoy some
 dominion over the control structures in operation on their behalf the
 civic engagement offered through accountability must exist as a feature
 of control strategies. (Whether effective engagement is to go beyond
 opportunity.) Assurances of participation require actionable guaran
 tees if they are to maximise the potential of accountability.
 In order for accountability to be instrumental in severing the nexus
 between corruption and control it needs to influence opportunities for
 corruption, control, and any resultant nexus. This influence must arise
 not only from a punitive dimension but also from the features of ac
 countability which stimulate responsibility, openness, participation,
 and compliance. AQ
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 Notes
 1. This was well evidenced in NSW when the ICAC uncovered corrupt activities in
 the issuing of motor vehicle licences by Motor Vehicle Driving Instructors. The
 statutory regulations provided for under the Motor Traffic Act and Regulations,
 and the Motor Vehicle Driving Instructors Act create a monopoly market for drivers
 licences, wherein the instructors possess a potentially lucrative discretion (see
 ICAC Annual Report, 1990: 54-55).
 2. A principal regulator of both criminal relationships, and the flow of law
 enforcement information is the police. In its report into the use of prisoner
 informants the ICAC identified the invitations towards corruption which emerge
 from the close relationship between law enforcement officials, and criminal
 informants (see ICAC (1993) Report on Investigation into the Use of Informers).
 3. Although this paper remains largely at the level of theoretical discourse, it has
 an applied dimension. Accountability in law enforcement, and crime control, is as
 much a specific policy concern as it is an article of faith. A recognition that
 accountability requirements generate ambiguous responses and consequences,
 should impinge on the construction of accountability mechanisms.
 For policy makers the notion of ambiguity has particular significance when
 considering the expectations for accountability. If the punitive dimension of
 accountability, for instance, is viewed as appropriate when directed against
 corruption but not corruption control, then the domain and impact of
 accountability may be conditional and partial, and as such can produce
 unintended results from a control strategy in which it is employed.
 4. For example, it is impossible to understand the difficulties which plague
 mechanisms of police accountability unless one appreciates the features of
 power which prevail in the exercise of police discretion (see Selby, 1988; Travis,
 1983).
 5. Take, for example, the ICAC's inquiry into the unauthorised use of government
 information. By exposing the nature of certain corrupt relationships, and the
 details of particular players in the trade, the form of market participation has
 altered. Yet, as the ICAC acknowledged, without a fundamental rethink about how
 government information should be appropriately available, and disseminated, the
 trade in such information will not cease. Following the ICAC's intervention it now
 seems that the market conditions which require such corrupt relationships for
 information transaction have simply relocated and become even more profitable,
 as a result of the inquiry (see ICAC, 1992).
 6. The ICAC's investigation of fraud and dishonesty by people connected with the
 supply of carpets to government departments illustrates this link. The tendering
 process for the provision of carpeting had operated in such a lax way as to restrict
 effective competition. Opportunities arose for government officials to favour
 certain carpet suppliers in return for the sharing of benefits and secret
 commissions for the officials, and employees of the carpet company. If regulation
 through the tendering process had been open and competitive then the
 opportunity which encouraged corrupt relationships would not have arisen (see
 ICAC Annual Report, 1991: 32-33).
 7. See: Independent Commission Against Corruption Act, sections 8 & 9.
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 8. See: Balog, & Stait v ICAC [1990] ALJR 400, Greiner, & Moore v ICAC NSW
 Court of Appeal (CA 40346-7/92) 21/8/92.
 9. Parliament of NSW Committee on the ICAC (1993) Review of the ICAC Act
 10. For instance, the use of criminal or prisoner informants in the law enforcement
 process. See ICAC (1993) Police Informants: A Discussion Paper, Note the
 contradictory manner in which the ICAC relied on the testimony of prominent
 prisoner informants such as Neddy Smith in its recent enquiry into police
 corruption.
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